The appointment of General Korobov says a lot about the priorities of GRU
From: Alex Leshy, February 3rd, 21:41
– “The fact that between the death of Igor Sergun and appointment to the post of chief of the GRU Igor Korobov was almost a month, suggests that the country’s leadership had to decide on priorities. Possible changers Sarguna have their own strengths. The choice in favor of General Korobov illustrates the role of the GRU is removed in the area of national security.“
– “Appointment of chief of the GRU (as, indeed, SVR) is always a significant event. But it has little to do with purely political circumstances and the “fight of clans”, which started to search immediately after the sudden death of General Igor Sergun. Intelligence and military, and civil – technical, routine, priorities in it are not connected with the internal policy or changes of government. It is important to have continuity and professionalism, without prejudice, of course, and the need for periodic metered reforms.
The disbanding of the Military Institute of foreign languages in 1993, had further exacerbated the situation with human resources and professional training.
With all this, the candidature of the chief of military intelligence demonstrated by the vector in which intelligence will evolve, and the priorities of the moment. (…) Perhaps, this was a predefined month time lag: Igor Sergun died on 3 January, as the new chief of the GRU was appointed only on February 2. On the other hand, in such a situation is made in the end the choice proved to be particularly revealing.
But the ability to rate strategic information, to structure the overall flow and select the most significant was defined by the present choice of the new chief of the GRU in favor of General Igor Korobov. His track record is less definite than others, but most of his career he was directly associated with strategic intelligence and supervised this direction in the post of first Deputy of the head of Department.
In modern GRU strategic intelligence is structurally divided between the regional offices and special Office of strategic doctrines and arms. Given the specificity of the GRU, the processing of strategic data more attention there is devoted to military matters and not policy. But in today’s world has significantly increased the role of theorizing in the first place, for strategic military planning. The army now do not develop in a linear way, just increasing quantitatively and improving their weapons, and according to a theoretically constructed strategies. In an unexpected development can get such weapons, which previously were neglected. Another example is the emergence of the military-political crisis in the previously stable region. To assess such threats and requires a new approach to the collection, and most importantly – to the processing and evaluation of operational data, claiming “strategiest”. The lack of this kind of system strategic analysis suffered from the KGB the late Soviet period, and even specifically created the office with General Leonov situation has not changed, but only worsened the problem, as Leonov and the company too carried away with conspiracy theories.
Now the need for strategic evaluation information is greater than ever in the history of the Russian Federation. Choice General Korobov for the position of chief of the GRU could be predefined in this scenario and accompanying calculations in the country’s leadership and the army. And this, in turn, generates a new vector of development of military intelligence, including in terms of internal reforms and recruitment. No politics. Only pragmatics.